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IN THE 2CPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

ARA OTTESON and NELLIE A.
OTTESON, husband and wife,
Plaintiffs-Respondents,
vs
RICHARD D. MALONE and HILA SUE
MALONE, husband and wife,
Appellants-Defendants.

Case No. 15478

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a civil case wherein the Appellants appeal from
that portion of the trial court judgment declaring Appellants'
option to purchase real property void and denying Appellants'
demand for specific performance of said option.

Appellants

also appeal from the Order denying their Motion for New Trial
and Alternative Relief by Amendment of Findings, Conclusions,
and Judgment.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
This matter came for trial before the Honorable Edward
Sheya, Judge of the Seventh Judicial District Court for Emery
County on December 7 and 8, 1976.

The Court declared void

the

option to purchase provisions of a "Lease and Option" executed
between the Appellants and the Respondents.

The Court also

denied the Appellants' demand for specific performance of
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option to purchase and denied Appellants' Motion for New Trial
and Alternative Relief by Amendment of Findings, Conclusions,
and Judgment.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellants seek judgment declaring their option to purchase valid and granting their request for specific performance
of said option.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
This case came for trial before the Honorable Edward Sheya,
District Judge, on December 7 and 8, 1976. That portion of the
Judgment appealed from regards an instrument entitled Lease and
Option executed by the appellants and the respondents.
The appellants had previously purchased from the respondents
10 acres of land without water rights.
1974, appellants

Thereafter,on June 27,

prevailed on the respondents to lease them

an additional 28 acres which could be irrigated.

Considerable

discussion followed concerning the exact nature of the lease.
Eventually, Mrs. Otteson suggested that Mr. Boyd Bunnell,
Attorney at Law, be contacted to draw up the necessary document.
Because of her poor health, Mrs. Otteson did not personally see

Mr. Bunnell, but Mr. Otteson and Mrs. Malone visited his office.
Mr. Otteson, however, had difficulties with the batteries in
his hearing aid and testified that he was unable to hear during
the meeting with the attorney.
The instrument entitled Lease and Option was subsequently
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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mailed to the parties who all testified that they had read the
same.
Again, the parties discussed the instrument and decided
that certain provisions needed clarifying.

The document was

returned to the attorney who re-wrote il accordingly and sent
the second draft to the parties.
The testimony at this point is divergent.

Mr. Otteson

testified that he and his wife read and signed the Lease and
Option at home.

The appellants claim that all four parties

met together and that Mr. Malone read aloud the second draft,
after which all of the parties signed the document.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE GRANTED THE APPELLANTS'
PRAYER FOR SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF THEIR OPTION TO
PURCHASE RESPONDENTS' REAL PROPERTY BECAUSE THE
RESPONDENTS ARE BOUND BY THE TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF
THE LEASE AND OPTION AS CONTAINED WITHIN THE FOUR
CORNERS OF THE WRITTEN INSTRUMENT.
The Lease and Option at issue in this case is neither a
lengthy nor a legally complex instrument.

It is but three

pages long, neatly written in standard size type, and clearly
labeled LEASE AND OPTION.

There are only nine provisions

listed under its "terms and conditions".
provisions refer

Three of those nine

specifically to the right of the Appellants

to purchase the property and how that right is to be exercis~·
In short, the Lease and Option is simple and unambiguous.
The trial Court decided early in its proceedings that
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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no question of fraud, misrepresentation, or undue influence
was involved.

(Tr. 123) Barring these factors, the Respondents

should be bound by their signatures on this straight-forward
instrument.

They should not now be permitted to admit evidence

varying the terms of the instrument.

In this regard, the

authors of 49 Am Jur 2d, Landlord and Tenant, Section 367 at
page 383 state:
"Generally speaking, evidence is inadmissible to vary
the unambiguous terms of a written lease granung the lessee
an option to purchase the premises. . . An option to
purchase in a lease constitutes a contract of sale when
the option is exercised, and it has been held that it may
be binding to such an extent that a court of equity will
remove it as a cloud upon title even after the period
of the lease has terminated,"
In April of 1974, the Utah Supreme Court handed down a
decision which bears directly on the instant case.

There

the Plaintiff-Appellant was a real estate,,pro)rnr appealing
from a lower court decision denying his recovery of a broker's
commission.

A printed provision in the "Exclusive Right to

Sell" document was at issue, and the defendant persuaded the
lower court that the provision, although precisely written,
was not the actual agreement of the parties.

The Supreme Court

in reversing the judgment emphasized the importance of excluding
parol evidence in the case of an instrument containing unambiguous
terms:
"Parol Evidence may be received to clarify ambiguous
language in a contract, to show what the agreement was
relative to filling in blanks, and to supply omitted
terms which were agreed upon but inadvertently left out
of the written agreement. However, under the general
rule which is applicable here, parole evidence may
not be given to change the terms of a written agreement
which are clear, definite, and unambiguous. To permit
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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that would be to cast doubt upon the integrity of all
contracts and to leave a party to a solemn agreement
at the mercy of the uncertainties of oral testimony given
by one who in the subsequent light of events discovers tro' [
he made a bad bargain.
"
1

1

Written words can be examined so as to ascertain what
they stand for in connection with particular conduct or
particular objects. Thus expressions of the parties
prior to and contemporaneous with the execution of a writt,,
instrument may be helpful in understanding the meaning of ,
the language used.
However, the defendant here does not
seek to explain the meaning of a paragraph.
He simply
wants the court to eliminate it in its entirety. This
,
the courts cannot do." E. A. Strout Western Realty Agencv,:
Inc., vs Owen H. Broderick 522 P2d 145, 146 (1974).
i
The Court buttressed this position by also citing

~·

Moran, Inc. vs First Security Corporation, 82 U 316, 24 P2d
384 (1933); Hatch vs Adams, 8 U2d 82, 329 P2d 285 (1958); and
Fox Film Corporation vs Ogden Theatre Co., Inc., 82 U 279, 17
P2d 294 ( 1932).
An earlier case, Rainford vs Ryt ting, 22 U2d 252, 451 P2c
769 (1969) had met with similar treatment by the court.

There

a corporate shareholder brought an action against two other
shareholders seeking to hold them liable as guarantors of a
corporate contract for the repurchase of plaintiff's stock.
The Supreme Court held that the defendants' affidavit

respoo~

to the plaintiff's request for summary judgment was inadequa~
because it c6nsisted orily

of inadmissible parole evidence.

In so holding, the Court on pages 771 and 772 quoted from

£.:J·

Moran, Inc, vs First Security Corporation supra.
"The rule is well settled that, where the parties have
reduced to writing what appears to be a complete and
certain agreement, it will, in the absence of fraud, be
conclusively presumed that the writing contained the
whole of the agreement between the parties, that it is
a complete memorial of such agreement, and that parole
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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evidence of contemporaneous conversations, represntations,
or s~atements ~ill not be received for the purpose of
varying or adding to the terms of the written document."
Again, the "LEASE AND OPTION" is an unambiguous document
written in terms of common usage.

A reasonable man perusing

the instrument could readily ascertain that two things are the
subjects of the instrument:

A lease, and an option to purchase.

Considering that approximately 1/3 of the document refers directly
to the option and that words and phrases such as "purchase",
"purchase price", "fair market value" and "retain a life estate",
are scattered throughout the document it is difficult to believe
that the Respondents were not cognizant of the purpose of the
instrument, especially considering the testimony by Mr. Otteson
at trial that he had read the document.
The purpose of the parol evidence rule is to protect parties of forthright contracts.

Since it is difficult to imagine

an instrument more concise and clear than the Lease and Option
in the instant case,

justice requires that the Appellants be

protected in their contractual expectations.

To permit other-

wise is to preclude the Appellants from a bargain which they made
every effort to guarantee by a precise writing.

The very pur-

pose of the parole evidence rule as stated by CJS points out
the need for its application in the present case:
"The rule is founded on the long experience that written
evidence is so much more certain and accurate than that
which rests in fleeting memory only, that it would be
unsafe, when parties have expressed the.terms of their
contract in writing to admit weaker evidence to control
and vary the strong~r and to show that the parties intended
a different contract from that expressed in the writing
signed by them.
It is obvious that written ~nstrum~n~s
would soon come to be of little value if their explicit
provisions could be varied, controlled, or superseded by
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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parol evidence, and it is also plain that a different
rule would greatly increase the temptations to commit
perjury . . . "32A CJS Evidence Section 851 at page 216.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT RESPONDENTS MISUNDERSTOOD THE OPTION TO PURCHASE, THAT SAID MISUNDERSTANDING CONSTITUTED UNILATERAL MISTAKE OF FACT, AND THAT
SAID UNILATERAL MISTAKE OF FACT VOIDS THE OPTION TO
PURCHASE.
On page 120 of the Transcript of the trial, Counsel for

t~.E

Appellants. moved for judgment in their favor regarding the
Lease and Option, claiming that the Respondents had not sustaine:
the burden of proof of showing any fraud, misrepresentation,
or undue influence.

After oral arguments by both counsel, the

Court replied to the motion:
"I'll tell you what I'm going to do.
If counsel would
like an opportunity to brief this, I don't want to be
hasty on this thing, but that is the way it looks to me /
at this time and I will take your motion under advisement.
If you care to submit written memoranda to me on this
question about whether that consideration extends to the
option or not. But I think that is the decisive factor
clearly if there was no consideration for that option.
I don't think you have a valid option or a binding option.
And would you like time to brief that before making a
j1
ruling?"
Both counsel then agreed to take two weeks to write memor1:·1
<d'a ·

directed to the question of the adequacy of

consideratio~.,

which they thereafter submitted to the Court.
The Court, however, in coming to its Memorandum Decisior,
completely bypassed the issue of consideration, the factor wW,
it claimed to be decisive, and ruled in the Respondents' fa~r
on the grounds of unilateral mistake.

(M. D. pages 2, 3, & 41.

This was clearly prejudicial to the Appellants who had addre 5
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lhe consideration issue as requested and sufficient to constitute a substantial error as required by Rule 61 URCP.
This in itself should be grounds for overturning the lower
Court's decision.
Moreover, it is clear from the testimony at trial that
Respondents had ample opportunity to fully understand the
document which they signed.

Mr. Otteson testified that he

had at least two conferences with Malones regarding the document
before it was ever drafted

(T. 42)

~

that he had good

eyesight and could read (T. 43); and that both Respondents
read the intrument (T. 45 & 46).

He further testified that

he discussed the first draft of the Lease and Option with the
Appellants before sending it back to the attorney and when the
second draft arrived both Respondents again read it.

(T 72

& 82)

Mrs. Malone testified that the first draft was returned
in order to specify that lease payments be credited to the purchased price (T. 127) and when the second draft arrived, Mr.
Malone read it aloud to all four parties before they signed
it.

(T,

129)

Mr. Malone, in turn, testified that the first draft was
corrected specifically to clarify the purchase money agreement
and that he read aloud the Lease and Option to all of the
parties.

(T. 148 & 149)

The Respondents,

therefore, had ample opportunity to

study both drafts of the document before signing.

Mr. Otteson

verified that both of the Respondents had read the final
document and that he himself had realized when he signed

that
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the option provision was within the instrument.

In its F

of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the trial Court concluded that
Mr. Otteson appeared to be in "good health and of sound and
disposing memory".
It is clear from the foregoing that the Respondents had
every occasion to study the Lease and Option and to consult iiit
the attorney who had prepared it.
Similarly, the Supreme Court in Garff Realty Co. vs Better,
Buildings, Inc., 234 P2d 842 (1951) considered an action broug:
to recover a real estate broker's commission where the central
issue concerned the defendant's knowledge of what he had
On page 844 the Court oointed to the negligence of the

si~&

defend~

in not exercising care in what he signed:
"The trial court properly sustained the objection to the
question:
'At the time you signed this were you aware
of the provision in that last paragraph?' There was no
plea of mistake, fraud or overreaching·, or of misrepresentation. The answer of the defendant to the effect
that the agent of 'defendant who executed said agreement
was not aware of the provision of said agreement relati~
to the payment of the commission and that it was not
the intention of the defendant to become bound for the
payment of any commission,' does not sufficiently state
any legal defense. The governing rule is thus stated i~
12 Am Jr, Contracts, Section 137, pp. 628-29:
Ignorance
of the contents of an instrument does not ordinarily
affect the liability of one who signs it.
If a man
acts negligently and in such a way as to justify others
in supposing that the writing is assented to by him, he
will be bound both at law and in equity, even though he
supposes the writing is an instrument of an entirely dif·
ferent character. The courts appear to be unanimous in
holding that a person who, having the capacity and an
opportunity to read a contract, is not misled as to its
contents and who sustains no confidential relationship
to the other party cannot avoid the contract on the groul
of mistake if he signs it without reading it, at least~,
the absence of special circumstances excusing his fa11~ 1 '
to read it,
If the contract is plain and unequivocal Hi
its terms, he is ordinarily bounct thereby."
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Another case decided in the same year, Ashworth et al vs
Charlesworth et al., 231 P2d 724 (1951) touched on the negligence of a party signing a contract and its relationship to a
claim of unilateral mistake:
"Williston on Contracts, Section 1577, P. 4407, explains
the effect of negligence on a contract as follows:
'Where
the signer of a writing has made an innocent mistake as
to the nature of his act without carelessness whether
induced by fraud or not, the writing is not his expression
and there is no contract.
But if a man acts negligently, '
and in such a way as to justify other in supposing that
the terms of the writing are assented to by him and the
writin is acce ted on that su osition he will be bound
both in law and in equity . . . '
Emphasis added by:the Court) And
in Section 1596, on page 4447, the author states:
'It is
frequently said that equity will not reform or rescind a
contract if the petitioner has been guilty of negligence,
or at any rate of gross negligence.
That no such principle
can be laid down as a universal rule is obvious.
In many
if not most cases of mistake in the expression of a contract where reformation is granted, there is some element
of lack of care, but, at least, if the mistake is mutual
and each party has ·~een careless in failing to make a
contract expressing the real intention of both, there
seems no reason why relief should not be granted, unless
this is made inequitable by some change of position other
than merely entering into the contract in question.
But
if unilateral mistake, where there is no fraud or ineqUTtable conduct, is ever to be regarded as sufficient ground
for the rescission of a bi-lateral contract, there is more
reason why a court of equity should confine its jurisdiction to cases where the party seeking relief has been free
from negligence, since the blame of the situation lies
wholly on the party seeking relief. . .
"
(Emphasis
added by the Court)
231 P2d at 727.
It is the contention of the Appellants

that any mistake

on the Respondents' behalf could have easily been avoided by
the exercise of ordinanry care and diligence.

This position

is strengthened by the CJS discussion of unilateral mistake as
it relates

to specific performance:

"Even a mistake which is entirely defendant's own, or that of
his agent, and for which plaintiff is n~t.directly or
indirectly responsible, may defeat specific performance.
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In such case, however, the mistake must be ~n honest one
which is not imputable to defendant's negligence or inexcusable carelessness, and the situation must be such
that a granting of specific performance will work an unreasonable hardship on defendant as compared with the injury that will result to plaintiff from a denial of specif '
relief." CJS, Specific Performance, Section 51, pp. 833- ··
834.
Moreover, it is doubtful if unilateral mistake of the
type embodied in the instant case is sufficient to void the
option.

Unilateral mistake can readily be broken into two

divisions:

Mistakes of facts and mistakes of law.

The situaL:

surrounding the signing of the Lease and Option is better
classified as belonging to mistakes of law since the

Responden~,

admitted at trial that they were fully aware of the option
provisions in the Lease and Option but supposedly failed to
comprehend its legal consequences.
Traditionally, courts of equity have been hesitant to
provide relief for mistakes of law.

This position is illustra:-

by a portion of the decision rendered in Board of Education of
Sevier School District vs Board of Education of Piute School
District, 39 P2d 340 (1934) on page 341:
"So, too, in 13 C. J. 379, the author says that it is laic
down in general language in many cases that a mistake,
in order that it may affect a contract, must be a mistake
of fact, and that a mere mistake of law will not affect
the enforceability of an agreement, and that a mistake
of law is where the person knows the facts of the case
but is ignorant of the legal consequences."
There are no other Utah cases directly analogous to the
present case, but decisions rendered by the Supreme Courts of
two other western states are helpful.
The first is Everett G. Schwieger vs Harry W. Robbins
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Wash.
and Company, 290 P2d 984 (1955).

This case involved a personal

injury action brought for injuries sustained when hay fell from
the defendant's truck onto the plaintiff's truck.

The court

found for the defendant basing its decision on a release signed
by the plaintiff.

The plaintiff appealed, contending that

although the release specifically referred to personal injuries
it had been given for the purpose of a property settlement. In
finding for the defendant, the court emphasized:
"The release is in plain and unambiguous language,
We
often have said that the courts will not interpret the
meaning of unambiguous contracts.
(Citations omitted)
Neither will the courts permit oral ~vidence to establish
or create an ambiguity in a written contract. . . .
The
appellant admits signing the release.
He contends that he
signed it because he believed no claim for personal injuries then existed under the law.
A mistake of law is
an erroneous conclusion with respect to the legal effect
of known facts.
A mistake of law, in the absence of fraud
or some like cause, is not a ground for avoidance of a
contract." 290 P2d 986.
The second case, although dealing particularly with
workman's compensation, includes an informative discussion as
pertaining mistakes of law:
"It is a legal maxim that everyone is presumed to know the
law. . . .
It has been held that a mistake of law does
not excuse a party to a contract, unless it be a mutual
mistake of both parties thereto, and then is analogous
to a mistake of fact, but if there is mutuality of mistake either of law or of fact, the party upon whom the
burd~n rests must allege and prove such fact." Elmer
Lee Flott vs Wenger Mixer Manufacturing Co.L 189 Kan.
80, 367 P2d 44 (19~1) ~
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THERE WAS
SUFFICIENT CONSIDERATION FOR THE OPTION TO PURCHASE.
The Court

itself raised the issue as to whether an
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Option to Purchase real property contained in a written lease
of the same property must be supported by sufficient consideration independent and separate from the consideration of
other covenants and conditions set forth in the remaining
paragraphs of the lease and option agreement.

The Court expr":'

its concern and raised this issue after reading the following
language contained in 17 CJS, Contracts, Section l(l)(F) at
page 542 and 543:
"In the law of contracts, an option is an agreement to
keep an offer open, or an offer to enter into a contract
coupled with a promise to hold the offer open for a given
period of time, which promise is or is not binding on the
offerer depending on whether or not it is supported by
consideration. In other words, it is a continuing offer
or contract, made irrevocable for a fixed period when giver:
for a present consideration. •
"
Defendants agree that an option to purchase must be supported by sufficient consideration.

However, the above quoted

language does not answer the question of what would constitute
sufficient consideration in an option to purchase.

In the case

before the Court, defendants argue that the Lease and Option
Agreement is a single document, that the Agreement sets forth
the amount and number of rental payments to be made, and that
the Option to Purchase clause contained in the Lease and Optioo
Agreement need not be supported by independent consideration
because the rental payments and other covenants and conditions
of the Agreement constitute sufficient consideration to not
only support and validate the Lease but also the Option to
Purchase.

The Court's question is answered and the defendants'

position supported by 51C CJS, Landlord and tenant, Section 811
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Page 14
at page 238:
"An.agreement whereby the lessee of property is given an
option to purchase the leased premises, like other con-.
tracts, must be supported by a sufficient consideration.
Where the lease and the option constitute but one contract
the provisions of which are interdependent, the consider- '
ation for the lease supports the option; in other words,
the agreement to pay rent or do other acts, and the fulfillment of such ob~igations on the part of the lessee, will
support the option as well as the right to occupy under
the lease.
Thus, an option to purchase contained in a
lease is not subject to attack on the ground that it is
unilateral and lacks mutuality in that it binds the lessor
notwithstanding the lessee is not bound to purchase."
The only Utah case touching upon the issue is Tilton vs
Sterling Coal

& Coke

Company, 28U 173, 77 P 758

(1904)~

In

dispute was an Agreement containing a Lease of and accompanying
Option to Purchase water.

That Utah Supreme Court addressed

itself to the issue of whether the lessee could exercise the
Option to Purchase within a reasonable time after the Lease had
terminated.

However, the opinion contains the following dictum

which is relevant to the case presently before the Court:
"When an option is given to a lessee to purchase the
leased premises, the lease is a sufficient consideration
to support the option, and the lessor cannot withdraw it
before the time given in which to accept it has expired.
77P at 760."
For the sake of brevity, defendants cite a sampling
judicial opinions throughout the Western States only.

of

In

Carlena vs Vollmert Tire Company, 540 P2d 1149 (Colorado 1975)
plaintiff lessor commenced legal proceedings to terminate the
Lease and obtain possession of the premises from defendant lessee.
On appeal from adverse trial court decision, plaintiff lessor
contended that the Option to Purchase clause contained in the
Lease Agreement was not supported by consideration.

The Court's
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opinion contains a verbatim quote of the Option to Purchase
clause:

"(2)
It is further agreed that at any time prior to
April 1, 1977, and within ninety (90) days following
April 1, 1977, the lessee, only, shall have an option to
purchase all the entire building at a total purchase
price of ONE HUNDRED TEN THOUSAND AND N0/100 ($110,000),
said sum of money, being the total purchase price, and shai'
be paid to the lessor by the lessee under the following
terms and conditions.
"
540 P2d at 1150.
The Colorado Appellate Court affirmed the trial Court, and
disagreed with plaintiff lessor's argument that the Option to
Purchase lacked consideration:

"There is also no merit in the lessor's final contention
that the option to purchase clause was not supported by
consideration.
As the trial court found, such clauses are \
supported by the reciprocal promises in the lease, such
as the lessee's promise to pay rent."
Id. at page 1151.
The Supreme Court of Wyoming held that an option to purchase contained in a lease is supported by consideration in
Braten vs Baker,

323 P2d 929

(Wyoming 1958).

Therein, plain-

tiffs sought specific performance after they elected to exercise the purchase option contained in the written lease agreeThe lease agreement was partially printed and partial~

ment.

type written, and contained the following option to purchase
clause:
"Party of the second part shall have the option of purchasing said real property at the end of five years for
the sum of $6, 000. 00.
Interest included.
Payment to be
made at the rate of $500. 00 on March 1, 1955, and a like
amount on the first day of March on each year thereafter
until the full amount is paid.
323 P2d at page 930.
Defendant lessor contended on appeal that the option to
purchase was not supported by consideration and therefore void.
The Wyoming Supreme Court disagreed,

holding:
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"It seems so well settled that a purchase option contained
in a lease is supported by consideration that elaboration
should be unnecessary.
See James, Law of Option Contracts
1916 ed., Section 101, p. 2, Section 321, p. 135; 51 CJS
'
Landlord and Tenant Section 81, p. 636; Bacon vs Kentucky
Cent. Ry. C., 95 Ky. 373, 379, 380, 25 S. W. 747, 749, 16
Ky. Law Rep. 77, 80; McCormick vs Stephany, 57 N. J. Eq.
257, 262, 41 A. 840, 842, Id., 61 N. J. Eq. 208, 48 A.
25; rrank vs Stratford-Handcock, 13 Wyo. 37, 54, 55, 77
P. 134, 137, 67 L. R. A. 571; 32 Am. Jur., Landlord and
Tenant, Section 299, pp. 278, 279; 5 Williston, Contracts,
Rev. ed. 1936, Section 1441, p. 4026." Id. at page 931.
In Mccreight vs Girardo, 287 P2d 414 (Oregon 1955)~ the
Appellate Court, in ruling, inter alia, on the validity of an
option to purchase clause contained in a real estate lease agreement, stated the following:
"This lease contains a right which, if seasonably exercised
by the defendant, could have changed the relationship from
landlord and tenant to that of vendor and purchaser.
The consideration stated in the lease furnishes the consideration for the option to purchase. . .
" 287 P2d at 417.
The option to purchase clause contained in that lease
agreement read as follows:
"Lessee shall have an option to purchas.e the above described premises during the term of this lease or renewal
thereof, for the purchase price of Twenty Six Thousand
Dollars ($26,000.00)~ upon terms which will be mutually
agreed upon by the parties hereto at the time of said
purchase.
It being understood that Lessee will be given
credit on said purchase price of the amount of $100.00 per
month for each month of rental paid to Lessor during the
life of this lease or any renewal thereof." Id. at page
415.
rinally, in Bell vs Minor, 199 P2d 718 (California 1949)
defendant lessor appealed from the trial Court's decree of
specific performance awarded to plaintiff lessee.

At issue

was the validity of a lease agreement containing an option to
purchase clause.

The California Court of Appeals stated:

"The provisions of the lease, including the rental to be
paid, furnish the consideration for the option to purchase."
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199 P2d at 720.

The foregoing case law and secondary authorities are di-

As

rectly applicable to the case presently before the Court.

a review of the Lease and Option Agreement will reveal, the Lea:;
and Option to Purchase are contained in one single contract.
Furthermore, paragraph 2 of said Agreement sets forth the rent,·
payments to be paid on an annual basis, which, according to th,
foregoing case law and secondary authorities, is sufficient in
and of itself to also constitute sufficient consideration for
the Option to Purchase.

In addition, however, the Option to

Purchase clause contained in paragraph 5 of the Agreement makes
reference to the Lease payments and that the same shall apply
towards the purchase price in the event that the defendant
lessees exercise the Option to Purchase the real estate.

Con-

sequently, the lease payments are directly tied into the

granti~:

of the Option to Purchase and constitute
tion therefore.

sufficient considera-

Finally, additional consideration in the forn

of defendants agreeing to let plaintiffs retain a life estate
on that portion of the property on which their home was locatec,:
was given by defendants in return for the Option to Purchase.
CONCLUSION
There was a concise, written agreement between the Appellants

and the Respondents

regarding the Lease and

purchase of the 28 acres of real property.

The provisions of

the Lease and Option were definite, unambiguous, and to the
point.

All of the parties read the document, had ample time
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to consider its ramifications, and had opportunity to consult
with the attorney who had prepared it.
A reasonable person could ascertain the scope of the instrument by a quick reading of its contents.

The Respondents

themselves had occasion for a thorough analysis of its contents.

If they indeed were mistaken, the mistake was attributable

to their own negligence and was a mistake as to the legal
consequences of their signing.

The Appellants, themselves

prudent throughout their dealings in the matter, should not now
be deprived of their

option to purchase because of a

careless mistake on the part of the other parties to the transaction.
Case law firmly supports the proposition that there was
sufficient consideration to support the option.

This issue,

as suggested by the Trial Court itself, was the critical factor
in determining the validity of the Lease and Option.

The trial

Court erred in denying the Appellants' prayer for specific
performance on grounds quite apart from this determinative
factor.

The Appellants should now have their option declared

fully valid and they should be granted specific performance of
their right to purchase.
DATED this

;-7fj

day of December, 1977.
Respectfully submitted,
MICHAEL R. JENSEN
Frandsen, Keller & Jensen
Professional Building
90 West 1st North
Price, Utah 84501
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
Mailed two copies of the foregoing Appellants' Brief with
postage prepaid this

/7/i. __ day of December, 1977, to the attornej

for Respondents addressed as follows:
NELSON & CASSITY,

Donn E. Cassity, ROMNEY,

136 South Main Street, Suite 404, Kearns Build'

Salt Lake City, Utah

84101.
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